Simulation Analysis of Paradoxical Navigation in Traffic Congestion Network

N. Mukai and T. Watanabe (Japan)


Selfish Routing, Braess’s Paradox, Route Optimization, and Multi-Agent Simulation.


In this paper, we consider the problem “how to control people flow in traffic congestion to lead them to destination places?”. People tend to behave selfishly in some panic situations such as disasters (i.e., giving the priority to my self than other people in order to survive). Such selfish behaviors cause traffic congestion in routes, and have neg ative effects on traveling time. Therefore, we propose a new navigation concept ”paradoxical navigation” based on “braess’s paradox”. This concept represents that the paths to escape exits are restricted to avoid the traffic congestion. Moreover, we propose a greedy search algorithm to find bottle-neck (traffic congestion) paths. In the last of the pa per, we report our simulation results, and discuss the effect of our proposal methods.

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