Research on the Investment Management of Asymmetric Enterprises' Technology Innovation Project

H. Pan (PRC)


Investment management, Technology innovation project, Option game, Game equilibrium


The paper conducts a research on investment management of enterprises’ technology innovation project with asymmetric operating costs under imperfect competition by applying option game theory, laying emphasis on the influence on investment of technology innovation project from enterprises’ operating cost differences and time needed for innovation success. Taking two competing enterprises with asymmetric operating costs as research targets, the paper firstly puts forward the option value function and investment critical value, then carries out discussion on three existing game equilibriums, namely, preemptive equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and simultaneous equilibrium, and offers the conditions of emergence for them. The result suggests that, as for enterprises with asymmetric operating costs, the difference of operating cost and time needed for innovation success function as the major factors that influencing the type of equilibrium.

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