Mahito Hosoi and Yukio Uchida
optimization, institutional design and evaluation, multi-agent learning, economics, political science
Economics aims to achieve efficient resource allocation. In many cases, however, the real-world market is incomplete. For example, it is doubtful if the current election system will permit talented people to be elected in a national or local election. This indicates that efficiency improvement in allocating human resources as politicians has failed, and the existing economic theories do not seem to resolve this issue. On the other hand, due to the developments in information technology, it has become possible to utilize the Internet and websites in order to complement this incompleteness of market functionality. This allows for problem-solving at a low cost. In this backdrop, we have studied how to design a web council system, a web-based social optimization technique that will enable talented representatives to be elected. This paper points out incentives and spam voting as issues involving the web council system. In addition, it formulates a stratified estimation method as a learning method that will improve the reliability of predicting the results of voting on the basis of a straw poll, which is a weak point of the web council system. Community functionality provided by the Internet should be utilized to complement market functionality.
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